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Abstract 
This study seeks to increase our understanding of worker reactions to shirking by analyzing two new questions 
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Worker Responses to Shirking 
 
“Buddy – get to work, you’re taking money from my pocket” 
 – archetypal worker in team production 
 
What do workers do when they see someone slacking off in ways that reduce the productivity 
of their work group and enterprise? 
The rational response depends on the circumstances.  In a tournament race for 
promotions, having a competitor slack off is good news.  You don’t have to go all out to win 
the promotion.  Cheers for the shirker.  In a piece-rate pay system where the firm lowers the 
rate per piece when workers produce more than expected, you will also welcome the shirker.  
The more other workers shirk, the less likely will management lower the rate per piece and 
make it harder for you to earn your weekly pay. 
By contrast, when part of workers’ pay comes in the form of profit-sharing or share 
ownership or stock options, a worker who does not do his or her job takes “money out of 
your pocket”.  You’d be better off if someone took action against the shirker.  But standard 
analysis suggests that it will rarely be rational for anyone to intervene.  The full costs of 
reading the riot act to the shirker fall on the intervener but only part of the benefit accrues to 
them (in an N worker group the worker who intervenes gains only 1/Nth of the benefit going 
to workers and none of the benefit that goes to capital).  The implication is that rational 
workers should not act against a shirker just as rational players should not cooperate in a 
prisoner’s dilemma game.   
The facts are different.  Experimental economics finds cooperative behavior in all 
sorts of collective goods games when game theory rationality predicts that the rational player 
defects.  Theoretical models of cooperative behavior stress the role of players who voluntarily 
“police” cooperation by sacrificing some payoff  to penalize those who defect from the 
cooperative solution.  As the putative worker quote indicates, many workplaces develop 
cultures where workers discourage shirking.  Indeed, widely used forms of workplace 
arrangements, such as team production and group incentive plans, can succeed only if they 
overcome the free riding problem and stop shirking behavior.  Since workers often have 
better information than management on what fellow workers are doing, worker responses to 
shirking are critical to the success or failure of these schemes. 
This study seeks to increase our understanding of worker reactions to shirking by 
analyzing two new questions on shirking from the 2002 General Social Science Survey 2 
                                                
(GSS).  We developed the questions in order to illuminate the factors that enable some shared 
capitalist enterprises to overcome the free rider or 1/N dilemma.  Our guiding principle is the 
notion that for profit-sharing, worker ownership, and broad-based stock options to produce 
economic benefits, workers must “buy into” shared arrangements and create a workplace 
culture that discourages shirking.  The special segment of the GSS also included several 
detailed questions on shared capitalist programs. 
The first new question that we entered onto the GSS asked workers about their ability 
to detect the performance of other workers at their workplace: 
In your job how easy is it for you to see whether your co-workers are working well or 
poorly? On a scale of 0 to 10 please describe with 0 meaning not at all easy to see and 10 
meaning very easy to see 
  If workers cannot detect shirking, it is impossible to imagine them monitoring co-
workers and developing peer pressure against shirking, so the responses to this question 
define the feasibility of employees taking a lead role in reducing shirking. 
  The second question asked how workers would respond to seeing another employee 
shirk.  It used a three-part design.   
 
If you were to see a fellow employee not working as hard or well as he or she should, 
how likely would you be to:  
A. Talk directly to the employee;  
B. Speak to your supervisor or manager;  
C. Do Nothing    
 
We recognize that a better research strategy for determining employee responses to 
shirking would be to conduct a random assignment experiment in which we placed shirkers in 
different workplaces and observed what workers did.  But there is almost no chance that 
firms will cooperate with such a design.  Absent a controlled experiment, we chose to use 
survey analysis to gain insight into worker reactions to shirking in the real economy.
1  While 
people may not behave exactly as they say they would on a survey, survey responses 
generally correlate well with behavior, which explains their widespread use.  In our case and 
in most surveys respondents have no incentive to lie about their expectations of what they 
 
1  The other way we might get insight into responses to shirking would be to conduct an experiment in a 
laboratory setting. 3 
would do, so that at the minimum, the new questions should accurately measure how workers 
think they would respond to situations in which they observe shirking.   
We begin our analysis of the new survey questions by describing the distribution of 
responses to the questions and the interrelations of responses among the questions.  Then, we 
examine the characteristics of workers associated with different responses to the questions.  
Finally, we estimate how responses vary across firms that offer workers different financial 
incentives, workplace participation arrangements, and employee-management relations.  
Our principal findings are: 
1.  Most workers believe that they can readily detect shirking by fellow employees. 
2.  There is wide variation in the extent to which workers say they will act to 
discourage shirking.  Workers who are younger and less educated and in small firms are more 
likely to act against shirkers than other workers, but most of the variation in acting against a 
shirker occurs within demographic groups.   
3.  Organizational factors affect worker responses to shirking.  Workers are most 
likely to take action against shirkers in workplaces where employees are paid by profit 
sharing or gain sharing, and where they participate in decisions or work in team settings. 
4.  There are some intriguing interactions among the determinants of taking action 
against a shirking co-worker.  Workers are more likely to take action when they trust 
management/have good employee management relations and have some form of profit - or 
gain-sharing or grants of broad-based stock options than in other situations. 
The bottom line message from our analysis is that shared capitalist arrangements, in 
which firms share rewards and decision-making with workers and have good labor-
management practices, encourage workers to act against shirking behavior and thus to reduce 





A number of theorists have recognized that an important cooperative solution exists to the 
classic free rider problem. In a review of theory and evidence on the question, Canice 
Prendergast (1999:  7) underlines the critical weight of this issue by writing that “Incentives 
are the essence of economics.”  The problem can be conceived as a Principal-Agent problem.  
Adam Smith crystallized the point by writing that “The directors of such companies, 4 
however, being the managers of other peoples money rather than of their own, it cannot well 
be expected that they should watch over it with the same anxious vigilance with which the 
partners in a private co-partnery watch over their own” (2003).  Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
defined the problem and discussed monitoring and pecuniary and nonpecuniary bonding 
mechanisms for an intervention that can help to resolve it. 
As applied to various forms of shared capitalism (employee ownership, profit/gain 
sharing, and broad-based stock options), agency theory requires recognizing that the same 
Principal-Agent dilemma that affects owners and managers is also present in the relationship 
between management and workers, and among co-workers.  In the traditional approach to 
agency, senior management “employees” who operate the firm on a day to day basis must 
decide how to divide the “incentive pie” (fixed wages, stock, profit sharing, options, etc.) 
between themselves and the other employees.  Agency theory would suggest that this division 
may not necessarily be optimal for owners or fair to the other employees.  (This is the 
problem of executive compensation.)   
From this perspective, the employee incentive structure is a key mechanism in 
determining how the money of owners/shareholders gets spent either in the interests of 
maximizing profit or in the interest of  redistributing wealth to undeserving employees.  
Looking at employee ownership in this way requires a closer examination of both monitoring 
mechanisms and “non-pecuniary as well as pecuniary forms of bonding” that exist between 
workers and managers and among the workers themselves.  The original conception of 
Principal-Agent theory involved the separation of ownership and control (Jensen and 
Meckling 1976).  Examining this issue in terms of shared capitalism involves exploring what 
happens when various forms of control – variations in peer pressure, organization of work 
and the company’s culture – are recombined with various forms of shared capitalism. 
The 1/N problem can also be seen as a form of the "Prisoner's Dilemma" from game 
theory. (Rapoport and Chammah, 1965).  Theorists have suggested that the Prisoner's 
Dilemma may be overcome by a cooperative agreement among participants (Axelrod, 1984; 
Fudenberg and Maskin, 1986; Weitzman and Kruse, 1990; Ben-Ner and Jones, 1995).  The 
notion that there is a workplace solution to the Prisoner’s Dilemma has been suggested by 
researchers (see Blasi, Conte, and Kruse, 1996; Blasi, Kruse, and Bernstein, 2003:  226-228). 
In the workplace setting, this may involve developing a corporate culture that 
emphasizes company spirit, promotes group cooperation, encourages social enforcement 
mechanisms, and so forth.  Workers may discourage "shirkers" through peer pressure and 5 
nonpecuniary sanctions such as social ostracism, personal guilt, or shame (Kandel and Lazear 
1991).  Since the 1/N problem is lessened in small companies (which have a smaller 
denominator), such cooperative agreements may be easier to establish and maintain in small 
companies than in large ones.   
Theories of agent-based computational economics look at how autonomous economic 
agents develop interaction networks and develop social welfare outcomes.  This perspective 
develops a critique of “the top-down construction” of traditional economic models where the 
“face-to-face interactions among economic agents typically play no role” and “economic 
agents in these models have little room to breathe” (Tesfatsion 2002).  The application of this 
theory to the workplace suggests that the economic analysis of the production of economic 
value has been overly focused on the role of the top-down managerial hierarchy without a 
more textured look at interactions among workers.  In echoes of the corporate culture solution 
to the free rider problem, Axelrod (1997) has shown how mutual cooperation can develop 
among agents through reciprocity.  Klos and Nooteboom (2001) explore the creation of 
interaction networks that have trust as a major component.  A review of agent-based 
computational studies of firms in organizational theory “stress[es] the effects of a firm’s 
organizational structure on its own resulting behavior” (as quoted in Tesfatsion 2002; see 
Prietula, Carley, and Gasser 1998). 
  Prendergast (1999:  40) discussed the limitations of four studies of the free rider 
problem which “simply compare different productivity of partnerships on different sharing 
rules without addressing why contracts vary…” (1999:  40)  In his study of group incentives 
in medical practices, Newhouse (1973) discovered that increasing the share fraction received 
increased the overhead costs and decreased the hours which the doctors worked.  Research by 
Bailey (1970) and Gaynor and Pauly (1990) supported these conclusions.  In law firms, 
Leibowitz and Tollison (1980) found the bigger partnerships, the worse the cost containment.  
  Prendergast also suggested that monitoring with a sufficiently low cost can negate the 
free rider problem but finds that “empirical evidence on peer pressure reveals behavioral 
responses different from those posited in the theory”  although he observed that this evidence 
is “admittedly scant.”  The research in question is Weiss’s study of workers in a 
pharmaceutical company (1987) and Hansen’s examination (1997) of the incentives of 
telephone operators for a large financial corporation.  Both found that group incentives 
improved the performance of workers who were less productive under individual schemes but 
decreased the performance of more productive workers.  Prendergast also cited the steel 6 
industry incentive studies of Boning, Ichniowski, and Shaw (1998) and the profit sharing 
studies of Jones and Takato (1995), Kruse (1993) and Knez and Simester (1997), some of 
which present results that are “such a violation of standard agency theory” that alternative 
explanations need to be explored by looking at the role of peer pressure (1999:41)   
Prendergast sees methodological limitations in some of these studies.  Our use of a national 
random sample of both employees and establishments which includes a lot more detail on the 




Detecting Shirking  
 
In some jobs and workplaces it is relatively easy to tell if an employee is shirking.  The 
worker comes late and leaves early, spends most of his or her time at the coffee machine, 
calls in sick when the weather turns bad, and so on.  If the workplace is a boxing ring, the 
participant falls to the canvas at the first punch; if it is a battlefield, the participant drops his 
or her weapon and flees at the first shot.  In other jobs and workplaces, it is hard to tell if an 
employee is shirking.  Is the mathematician sitting alone in his office or, shades of Andrew 
Wiles, in his attic, thinking of ways to solve the Riemann hypothesis or pondering a vacation 
to France?  Is the office worker who spends the afternoon surfing the Web seeking 
information that may help solve a work-related problem or simply having fun?  Is the CEO 
charging the company for the gourmet meal at the expensive restaurant conducting business 
or charging the firm for his or her gastronomy? 
To get some sense about whether workers can readily detect shirking behavior, we 
asked whether workers could tell if fellow employees were working as hard or as well as they 
should, using the question given above.  We gave respondents an 11 point scale for 
answering.  The scale ranged from “not at all easy to see” (0) what coworkers were doing to 
“very easy to see” (10).  Figure 1 displays the frequency distribution of answers.  The 
distribution is highly concentrated at the upper end, with 43% of workers giving the highest 
possible answer (10) about the ease of detecting how co-workers are doing, and another 28% 
giving answers in the 7-9 categories.  Responses are also bunched at the 0 category as well, 
with 11% of workers giving the lowest score for being able to tell how others are doing, but 
otherwise there is a paucity of responses at the low end.  The overall pattern suggests that the 7 
vast majority of workers have (or think they have) a good idea of how hard their fellow 
employees are working.   
 As best we can tell, moreover, the variation among employees in their responses 
makes sense.  Workers who answered with a 7 or more to the question report 
disproportionately that they work in a team as opposed to by themselves, that they rely on 
coworkers and supervisors for help, compared to workers who answered 3 or less to the 
question about seeing how coworkers perform.  In addition, 13% who answered 7 or higher 
reported that they were managers compared to 7% of those answered 3 or less.  
 
 
Response to Shirking  
 
Given that most workers believe that they can observe the effort of co-workers, what do they 
do if they catch someone shirking? 
Figure 2 summarizes responses to the three-part question about what people would do 
if they saw someone shirking.  The responses use a four-point scale:  not at all likely, not very 
likely, somewhat likely, and very likely.  In addition since some respondents said that they 
did not have a supervisor or manager the sample size of answers to that question is smaller 
than the sample size for the other questions.   
Panel A of figure 2 displays the distribution of responses to whether the respondent 
will personally talk to the shirker.  The distribution is roughly uniform.  A substantial 
proportion of workers said that it was very likely they would talk to the employer, but an 
almost equally large number said that it was not at all likely that they would do so.  Panel B 
displays the distribution of responses to whether the respondent will talk to a supervisor or 
manager about the shirking behavior.  Proportionately fewer workers said that it was very 
likely they would talk to management than said that it was very likely they would talk to the 
worker themselves; and correspondingly more said that it was not very likely or not likely at 
all that they would speak with the manager or supervisor.  The implication is that many 
workers see taking the case to the supervisor as a more drastic act than confronting the 
shirker directly.  Finally, panel C of figure 2 displays the distribution of responses to the 
question of whether the worker said that they would do nothing in response to observing 
shirking behavior.  While a majority of workers said it was very unlikely or somewhat 
unlikely that they would do nothing, nearly one in four said they would in fact do nothing.  8 
                                                
  From these tabulations, we conclude that while most workers can tell when a fellow 
employee is shirking or not, there is wide variation in what they will do when faced with a 
situation in which someone shirks, possibly for reasons of personal attitudes or, of greater 





The three-part design of the shirking question allows us to check the consistency of answers.  
Someone who said it was very likely they would do nothing about the observed shirking 
should report that it was not at all likely they would talk to the employee or the supervisor.  
To see if responses are consistent across questions, panel A of table 1 presents cross 
tabulations of the answers to the shirking questions.  The columns give responses to the 
questions about talking to the worker or supervisor/manager.  For simplicity, we have 
organized the column data into four categories:  people who said it was very likely they 
would talk to the shirker or very likely they would talk to the supervisor; those who said that 
they were somewhat likely to talk with the shirker or somewhat likely to talk with the 
supervisor; people who said it was not very likely they would talk to the shirker or not very 
likely they would talk supervisor; and those who said that they were not at all likely to talk to 
the shirker or to the supervisor.  The rows give responses to the question about doing nothing 
but in reverse-coded order, so that they refer to the likelihood of doing something.  That is, 
the response very likely to do something was in fact the response not at all likely to do 
nothing.  We have done this to avoid the confusion of reading double negatives.  
Ideally, all of the answers would lie along the diagonal, but given the fuzziness of the 
four- point scale,
2 we measure consistency by whether or not many responses diverge greatly 
from the diagonal.  Sixty percent of answers lie along the diagonal and 34% lie in the spaces 
around it, whereas just 6% of responses diverge so much as to suggest either measurement 
error or an inconsistency in the responses.  These include the 20 respondents who said they 
were very likely to talk to the worker or supervisor but also said that it was very likely they 
would do nothing and the 35 who said it not likely they would talk to the supervisor or 
 
2  By fuzziness, we mean the inherent fuzzy arithmetic associated with qualitative statements such as very likely, 
somewhat likely, and so on, not to any fuzziness in the question.  Fuzzy numbers associate a range around a 
particular response, so that it is possible for individuals to mix categories – to be somewhat likely and somewhat 
unlikely.  9 
worker but said that it was very unlikely they would do nothing (though it may be that they 
have some other creative approach to dealing with shirkers).  From the limited number of 
seemingly blatant inconsistencies, we concluded that the questions elicited consistent 
responses. 
Another check on the reasonableness of answers is to contrast the responses of 
workers who said they could not readily observe the work of their co-workers with the 
responses of workers who said they could very easily see what co-workers were doing.   
Someone who said they could not easily observe their fellow employees effort ought to be 
more likely to do nothing in response to shirking behavior (after all, their information is 
patchy) compared to someone who can readily observe the behavior of fellow employees.   
Panel B of table 1 records cross-tabulations of responses to the shirking question by 
whether workers said they could easily tell how fellow employees were doing (responses 7-
10) or could not easily tell how fellow employees were doing (responses 0-3) shows that 
those who said they could tell easily were more likely to take action against the shirker than 
those who said they could not tell easily.  The difference in the distribution of responses 
between the two groups is highly statistically significant. 
 
 
Complementarity of Responses 
 
Are the acts of talking to a shirker and act of talking to a supervisor about shirking behavior 
complementary or substitute forms of behavior?  Is someone who takes one of these actions 
against shirking more likely or less likely to take the other action?  
The evidence in figure 2 that more workers are very likely to talk to the shirker than 
to the supervisor/manager shows that these responses are not perfectly correlated, but is 
insufficient to tell us whether the relation is positive or negative, large or small.  Table 2 
gives the cross-tabulation of responses the questions about talking to the shirker or to a 
supervisor/manager.  If there was no relation between the two responses, each column/row 
would resemble the others.  If, by contrast, workers likely to talk to the shirker are also likely 
to talk to the supervisor, the observations would be concentrated along the diagonal.  
The table shows a concentration of responses along the diagonal, implying a 
substantial positive relation between responses to the two forms of intervening against the 
shirker.  There are two large clumps of observations, 228 workers who report that it is very 10 
                                                
likely they would talk to the shirking employee and who also report that it is very likely they 
would talk to a supervisor/manager; and 301 workers who report that it was not at all likely 
they would do either of those actions.  The chi square measure of the relation is 713, which is 
significant at standard levels.  Coding the responses from 1 (not at all likely to speak to the 
shirker or to the supervisor) to 4 (very likely to speak), the standard Pearson correlation 
coefficient between talking to the shirker and to the supervisor is 0.48, which is significant at 
the 1% level.  Since the responses are polytomous, however, this understates the strength of 
the correlation.
3   
Complementarity between talking to workers and talking to supervisors dominates 
table 2, but the table reveals one imbalance that indicates the existence of some form of 
substitution.  Looking down the column for persons “very likely” to talk to a supervisor, we 
see that just 32 persons or 9% of those respondents said it was not at all likely that they 
would talk to a worker.  Looking along the row for persons “very likely” to talk to a worker, 
76 persons or 17% of those respondents said it was not at all likely that they would talk to 
supervisor.  The implication is that there is a fairly substantial proportion of workers who 
want to stop shirking but who do not regard telling management about a fellow employee 
shirking as appropriate behavior.  This reluctance may reflect attitudes from schooldays 
towards tattling to teachers.   
Finally, since it is easier to analyze a single scale measure of behavior than a set of 
polytomous variables, we examined whether responses to the three shirking questions could 
be amalgamated onto an “intervention/non-intervention” against shirking measure without 
loss of much information.  For simplicity, we formed a summated rating of responses to all 
three shirking questions, using a 1 to 4 scale, where 1 always measures the lowest 
intervention and 4 the greatest intervention.  The summated rating ranges from 3 to 12.  In 
this ordering a 12 means that the worker reported that it was very likely they would talk to the 
shirking employee and very likely that they would talk to the supervisor and not at all likely 
that they would do nothing.  A 3 means that they said it was very unlikely that they would 
talk to the shirking employee and very unlikely that they would talk to the supervisor and 
very likely that they would do nothing.  Figure 3 shows that the summary statistic does what 
a good scale index should do:  differentiating people along the relevant dimension in a 
relatively continuous way.  The new “intervention” variable has a mean of 7.53 and a 
 
3  The more appropriate statistic would be the polychoric correlation coefficient  11 
standard deviation of 2.90.  It provides a useful summary statistic, even though table 2 
showed that some elements lie off the diagonal. 
 
 
Demographic Characteristics and Responses to Shirking 
 
We examine next the socio-economic correlates of whether workers say that they 
would/would not intervene in the face of coworker shirking.  Because most demographic and 
economic variables are likely to affect the benefit from intervening and the cost of 
intervening against shirkers, it is difficult to predict how they will be related to responses to 
shirking.  We have explicit expectations about the correlations for only two variables.  The 
first variable for which we have strong priors is the number of workers in the enterprise.  
Workers in small workplaces are likely to benefit more from stopping shirking behavior than 
those in workplaces with more employees, so we expect size of enterprise to be inversely 
related to actions to limit shirking.  Second, since managers and other workers in the upper 
echelons of the company hierarchy have responsibility for firm performance, we expect them 
to oppose shirking actively.  We view the rest of the analysis of socio-demographic factors as 
descriptive - designed simply to measure what characteristics, if any, are associated with 
greater willingness to act against shirking:  age, gender, race, education, and so forth.   
 Table 3 summarizes the results of our analysis of the link between socio-economic 
factors and actions against shirking behavior. Column 1 records regression coefficients and 
standard errors from ordinary least squares of the summated rating measure of willingness to 
intervene against shirkers on standard socio-economic variables.  Column 2 records 
coefficients from a linear probability analysis of the likelihood that a worker was very likely 
to talk to a shirker or to a supervisor:  the dependent variable is one when the respondent said 
they would very likely talk to either the worker or supervisor and zero otherwise.  Column 3 
gives ordered probit estimates of the factors that affect worker responses to the question 
about their talking to the shirking worker.  Column 4 gives ordered probit estimates of the 
factors that affect worker responses to the question about their talking to a supervisor or 
manager.   12 
                                                
Among the demographic variables, age and being female reveal an interesting pattern.  
The coefficient on age is negative and significant in all four columns, indicating that older 
workers are less likely to intervene actively against a shirker than younger workers.  At the 
same time, however, workers with more tenure are more likely to intervene against shirking 
than workers with less tenure.  Perhaps older workers see smaller gains from stopping 
shirking since they are closer to retirement while those with greater tenure have more specific 
human capital tied up with the firm.  The coefficient on the dummy variable for female is 
significant in column 1 but not column 2, indicating that women may be less likely than men 
to take action against shirkers.  This appears to apply, however, only to one form of acting 
against a shirking co-worker.  The significant coefficient -0.312 in column 3 indicates that 
women are less likely than men to talk to a co-worker about their shirking behavior, while the 
non-significant positive coefficient 0.075 in column 4 indicates that they are not less likely 
(and may be more likely) to talk to a supervisor.  This suggests that women may often choose 
a different strategy to oppose shirking than men, possibly to avoid direct conflict with the 
shirking co-worker.  
Table 3 also shows that workers in management jobs are more likely to intervene, 
while workers in clerical occupations are the least likely to act against shirking. Most 
important in terms of free-riding behavior, workers in establishments with few employees (1-
9) are more likely to intervene when they see shirking than workers at larger workplaces.  
Although standard economic analysis provides no clean way to resolve the free rider 
problem, almost any theory of behavior predicts that free riding tendencies will be lower with 
fewer workers, and thus that workers would intervene more to stop shirking in a smaller 
workplace if shirking harms their economic position than in a larger workplace.
4  
Shared capitalism, participation, and labor-management relations 
Workers are likely to act against shirking when the expected benefit of such an action 
exceeds the costs.  This basic principle suggests that workers should be more likely to speak 
to a supervisor or to the shirker when they have some financial interest in the performance of 
the firm, be it through profit sharing, gain sharing, or some form of share ownership or  stock 
options.  It also suggests that they are more likely to act against shirking when they regularly 
participate in workplace decisions, since regular participation should reduce the cost of 
speaking out.  Finally, we expect workers to oppose shirking more actively when they have 
 
4   We also looked at the effect on union membership on responses to shirking, and found no relation. Including 
union membership reduced the sample size, so we simply deleted the variable. 13 
trust in management and good labor-management relations.  In these situations the link 
between their actions and potential future rewards is more amorphous, but still likely to affect 
responses to shirking.  If you don’t trust management, you can hardly be expected to report 
shirking to management.  If you regard labor-management relations as poor, you may regard 
shirking as a justifiable response to management’s poor treatment of workers.  
Table 4 shows the measures of shared capitalist compensation, participation, and 
labor-management relations in our data set.  In these tabulations we limit the sample to 
private sector employees, since the reward system for government workers differs from that 
for private employees (e.g., no profit-sharing, civil service regulations, etc).  To judge the 
plausibility of the estimates, we compare them with those from the 1994-95 Workplace 
Representation and Participation Survey (WRPS) – the first national survey devoted 
specifically to obtaining workers’ views of participation, labor-management relations, and 
workplace economic incentives (Freeman and Rogers, 1999).   
The column in Table 4 listed as GSS 2002 shows that in the 2002 General Social 
Survey, 34% of private sector workers reported being in profit-sharing plans, 23% reported 
being in gain-sharing plans, 21% said they owned company stock, and 13% reported that they 
had stock options (the relevant survey questions are in the appendix).  Taken together, 43% 
of workers said that their pay was affected by at least one of these forms of shared capitalist 
programs.  The column listed as NOS 2002 gives comparable estimates from the National 
Organizations Study conducted in coordination with the GSS.  This survey was administered 
to over 500 establishments that employed the respondents and their spouses in the GSS.  Our 
tabulation is limited to 315 private sector firms.  The NOS estimates of the extent of profit 
sharing and gain sharing are quite similar to the GSS estimates, while the NOS estimate of 
options granted annually is consistent with the GSS estimate of options held if options are 
granted on 3-4 year cycle.   
The WRPS found that 31% of US workers participate in firm decision-making 
through employee involvement committees, team production, or quality circles in the mid 
1990s. 5  Unfortunately, the 2002 GSS did not ask detailed questions about the organizational 
structure of employee participation in decision-making. Rather, it asked whether employees 
normally work as part of a team and how often they participate with others in determining 
how things are done at their job.  Table 4 shows that over 60% of private sector workers 
report working in a team setting; 40% report that they often participate with others in helping 14 
                                                                                                                                                       
set the way things are done on a job; and 30% say they do that sometimes.  To obtain a better 
fix on formal employee involvement programs, we went to the NOS survey.  The 2002 NOS 
asked employers the percentage of workers involved in self-managed teams; the percentage 
of employees involved in quality circles and employee involvement committees that 
occasionally meet to solve problems; and whether the firm had established a committee that 
meets regularly about worker safety.  The NOS figures in table 4 suggest that formal 
participative programs have a smaller reach than more loosely defined participation shown by 
the GSS.  According to the NOS 17% of US workers are involved in self-managed teams and 
17% are involved with employee involvement committees or quality circles, while nearly half 
of workers are in firms that had formal safety committees.  The GSS and NOS estimates on 
participation thus bracket the WRPS estimates. 
The WRPS found that a majority of US employees reported good labor management 
relations at their workplace and trusted management to carry out its promises to workers, but 
that a significant minority reported poor workplace relations or that had little trust for 
management.  The 2002 GSS results summarized in table 4 show a similar pattern, though 
there are some differences between the GSS figures and WRPS figures.  On the one side, the 
GSS finds less trust in management than did the WRPS:  28% gave management the highest 
trust on the GSS compared to 38% who gave management the highest trust on the WRPS 
(Freeman and Rogers, exhibit 3.3, p 46).  On the other side, 34% of workers placed labor-
management relations in the highest category on the GSS, which is nearly twice the 18% 
reported in the WRPS (Freeman and Rogers, exhibit 3.2, p 44).   
We surmise that these differences are due largely to differences in the wording of the 
survey questions, rather than to any change in attitudes over time.  The highest category in 
trust on the GSS required workers to say that they “strongly agree” that they trust 
management while the highest category for trust in management on the WRPS was defined as 
trusting management “a lot”.  Strongly agree would seem to more demanding than trusting a 
lot.  As for the difference in labor-management relations, the GSS called its highest category 
“very good” whereas the WRPS worded its highest labor-management relations as 
“excellent”.   
Separately, the 2002 NOS asked management how they rated labor-management 
relations at the workplace and how they thought employees would respond to the question of 
trusting management.  The responses given under the NOS column in table 4 show that 
 
5  Freeman and Rogers, table V-1, p 92 15 
management respondents rate labor-management relations considerably better than do 




Organizational Characteristics and Responses to Shirking 
 
To what extent, if at all, does the variation in the incentives, participation, and employee 
relations documented above influence worker responses to shirking behavior by co-workers?     
As a first step to answering this critical question, table 5 compares two measures of 
the responses of workers to shirking  in establishments with given practices and in 
establishments without those practices.  The first measure is the summated rating, described 
earlier.  The second measure is the proportion of respondents who said that they were very 
likely to talk to the worker or who said they were very likely to talk to a supervisor/manager.  
There are other ways to summarize the data, but these two statistics provide a good picture of 
the pattern in the data. 
Employees in workplaces that have profit sharing and those in workplaces that have 
gain sharing have statistically significantly higher scores on the summated rating measure 
than employees without those incentives.  Similarly, the proportion of workers who say that 
they are very likely to talk to the worker or to a supervisor/manager is significantly higher 
under profit sharing and gain sharing than the proportion of workers who say they would do 
so absent such financial incentives.  By contrast, there is no statistically significant difference 
between the responses of workers who own company shares or hold stock options and those 
who do not own shares or options. One possible explanation is that this survey was 
administered during and after one of the largest stock market corrections in recent history and 
workers holding stock or holding options saw little potential “profit” in these holding at that 
moment.  In addition, the more immediate rewards associated with profit or gain sharing are 
associated with stronger actions against shirking. 
The tabulations relating to workers’ reported participation in decision-making in table 
5 show that participation enhances the likelihood that workers will act against shirkers.   
Workers who are part of a team or who report that they often participate with others in 
deciding how their job is done have higher summated ratings and greater probabilities of 
acting against a shirker than workers who are not part of a team or who participate less.  As 16 
                                                
noted earlier, however, the GSS questions on participation do not identify formal 
participative programs, and thus are an imperfect measure of company policy or enterprise 
organization.  Workers who say they work as part of a team may operate in a group under 
management direction rather than in a self-directed team, while those who report 
participating in decisions may simply be referring to discussions with workers rather than any 
participative structure where they had any power to change management decisions. 
 To see whether acting against shirking is linked to formal participative programs, we 
analyzed the effect of the NOS responses of percentage of workers involved.  Since the 
percentage of workers covered by the programs averages just 17%, the link from the 
prevalence of the program to the possibility that a worker participates is noisy one.  A 
randomly sampled worker in firm with, say, 40% of workers covered by a program would be 
more likely not to be involved in the program than to be involved.  Still, the worker in the 
firm with 40% coverage would have 4 times the chance of being in the program than the 
worker in a firm with 10% coverage, and thus be expected to respond to shirking more than 
the worker in the firm with 10% coverage.  With the small number of workers in the GSS-
NOS (371 in our private sector sample), however, we obtained no statistically significant 
relation between our measures of worker response to shirking and either the percentage of 
employees in a self-directed team and the percentage of employees in a quality 
circle/employee involvement committee.  In fact, there is virtually no relation between 
workers reporting that they work on a team on the GSS and the employer reports of team or 
quality circle/employee involvement committees on the NOS.
6   
The final part of Table 5 shows the value of the two measures of worker responses to 
worker perceptions of labor management and trust in management.  The data support the 
notion that workers are more likely to act against shirking behavior when labor/management 
relations are good than when they view those relations as quite or very bad, and when they 
trust management than when they do not trust management.   
In sum, the GSS evidence supports the principle thesis of this study:  that workers are 
more likely to self-monitor their workplace under shared capitalist arrangements - be it 
financial sharing that gives them monetary incentive or shared decision-making that 
encourages them to participate in decisions - and when the firm establishes good workplace 
relations.  This analysis has, however, been univariate, which leaves open the questions of 
 
6 Dube and Freeman find that there is considerable disagreement between the employer reports and employee 
reports on other variables as well. 17 
                                                
whether the observed patterns could be due to differences in the demography of the work 
force across firms with different labor practices, or whether some of the patterns may be due 
to the inter correlation of practices, rather than to the independent effect of each. 
To examine these possibilities, table 6 presents the results of multivariate calculations 
that link the three measures of worker response to shirking to the organizational/company 
policy variables and the socio-economic factors identified in table 3.  The summated rating 
measure of worker responses is the dependent variable in columns 1 and 2.  Column 1 shows 
that, holding fixed for demographic and job variables (including the size of the 
establishment), profit/gain sharing has a substantial impact on the likelihood the worker will 
take action against shirking behavior.
7  Column 2 adds measures of participation – whether 
the worker works as part of a team and whether the worker participates often with others in 
determining how their job is done – and measures of employee management relations.  Both 
of the participation variables have a substantial positive impact on the summated rating, while 
the labor-management relations variables have no noticeable effect.  The calculations in 
columns (3) to (5) give similar results.  In (3), the dependent variable is the measure that 
takes value 1 if the worker says it is very likely that they would talk to a supervisor or that 
they would talk to the shirker, and 0 otherwise.  Profit/gain-sharing matters, as do the two 
participation variables.  In (4) the dependent variable is the ordered probit for talking to the 
shirker.  In (5) the dependent variable is the ordered probit for the likelihood of talking to a 
supervisor/manager.  Again, profit/gain sharing matters, as do the two participation variables.  
As the participation variables, which are based on worker reports from the GSS, are not well 
connected to employer practices from the NOS, we regard the results on the profit/gain 
sharing as more reliable in indicating responses to shared capitalist policies. 
  While we have examined different functional forms, we have thus far made no effort 
to specifically model interactions among the major organizational variables.  Analysis of the 
basic decision equation for workers to intervene against shirking suggests, however, that 
there should be some interactive effects.  The worker decides to intervene against a shirker 
when the expected benefits of intervening exceed the costs:  p (G) – Cost, where p is the 
probability that the intervention will succeed, G is the gain to the worker and C is the cost.  
The financial incentive would affect G; participation should affect p and the cost.  Labor-
management relations L-M might affect both G and p.  More complicated analyses, in which 
 
7  Profit and gain sharing are combined in one measure due to their high correlation (0.70).  Similarly, owning 
company stock and holding stock options are combined due to their high correlation (0.68). 18 
                                                
the worker is assumed to take account of the possible behavior of other employees, lead to 
even more complexity, which we will ignore.  Instead, we have looked for potential 
interactions of key variables in our data.  Table 7 and figure 4 give our main results.  In the 
table, we report specifications that include interactions between profit/gainsharing and view 
of management employee relations.   
  The message of Table 7 is clear:  profit/gainsharing is associated with taking action 
against shirkers only when combined with a very positive view of management employee 
relations.  The effect is strong and significant across all four specifications.  In contrast, 
profit/gainsharing with less favorable views of management employee relations, as well as 
positive views of management employee relations without any profit/gainsharing, are not 
associated with taking action against shirkers.  Figure 4 illustrates the results from column 3 
of the table.  Very similar results are obtained when profit/gainsharing is interacted with trust 
in management.
8  This makes sense:  employees are likely to take action to increase 
productivity only when they are confident that any gains will in fact be shared with 
workers—not withheld or frittered away by managers believed to be inefficient or ornery. 
  We have run a number of other exploratory specifications to see how shared 
capitalism arrangements may interact with other workplace policies (not reported here).  The 
positive profit/gainsharing effect on the likelihood of taking action against shirkers is 
significantly lower among those who plan to look for a new job in the next year (presumably 
because they will not be around to receive the profit share), and also significantly lower in 
companies with high injury rates (which could easily worsen management employee relations 
and decrease expected tenure).  While it is often theorized that financial participation will 
have a positive interaction with participation in decision-making in affecting worker 
motivation and performance (e.g., Ben-Ner and Jones, 1995), we do not find significant 
interactions using the GSS participation measures.  Again, this may reflect the limitations of 
the participation questions:  they do not measure actual participation in an employee 
involvement or similar program, but rather the subjective sense of participation in decisions 
affecting one’s job.  Profit/gainsharing is strongly associated with a sense of participation, 
shown both by the simple comparisons in Table 5 and by estimates that adjust for other job 
and demographic characteristics.  It is therefore possible that profit/gainsharing increases 
 
8  The correlation between trust in management and view of employee management relations is .60, indicating 
they appear to represent a common attitude. 19 
worker co-monitoring in part by increasing a sense of participation, but there is no extra 
interaction effect between the two.   
  In other exploratory specifications, we do not find that employee stock ownership or 
holding stock options have significant interactions with any of the measured policies.  This 
again suggests that immediate rewards are more of a motivator; in addition, it may reflect the 
poor stock market performance through 2002 as the GSS was being conducted, which could 
dampen worker views of the likely value of owning stock or holding stock options (many 
stock options were underwater at this time).  There is, however, an intriguing relationship in 
the NOS sample between the percentage of workers who received stock option grants in the 
past year (as opposed to currently holding stock options) and several of the workplace 
variables.  These grants - given at lower exercise prices as a result of the market decline – 
would have signaled to employees the possibility of some future profit.  The pattern in fact 
matches the profit/gainsharing results in Table 7:  workers are more likely to talk to shirkers 
to the extent that a favorable view of management employee relations (or more trust in 
management) is combined with a higher percentage of workers who received stock options in 
the past year.  Since recently-granted stock options were less likely to be underwater in 2002, 
the recipients may have been more optimistic than all stock option holders about the prospect 
of rewards from better workplace performance.  In addition, a working hypothesis for further 
investigation is suggested by the fact that profit sharing and gainsharing bonuses appear to 
generally come on top of standard levels of pay and benefits (Kruse, 1998).  Employee stock 
ownership and stock options may have positive effects when they function like profit sharing, 
as an additional incentive given to employees rather than being purchased by workers with 
their own salary or savings (e.g., when workers buy stock in employee stock purchase plans 





This study has examined employee responses to new questions on the General Social Survey 
2002 that we posed on whether workers can easily observe whether co-workers are shirking 
and how workers respond to shirking.  The answers to the new questions provide valuable 
insight into the likely magnitude of mutual monitoring and peer pressure against shirking 
behavior.  They show that most workers believe that they are able to observe the 20 
effort/activity of fellow workers, which is the first prerequisite for mutual monitoring and 
peer pressure against shirking to work.  In addition, about half of the work force says that 
they would be very likely to respond to poor job performance by co-workers, with more 
saying that they would talk to the shirker rather than reporting the behavior to management.  
While there are some demographic correlates to responding against shirking, workplace 
factors are more strongly related to employee efforts to reduce shirking.  Employees respond 
more against shirking in workplaces with shared capitalism institutions, notably profit/gain 
sharing, recent grants of stock options and employee participation in decision-making, and 
where labor-management relations are good.  While firms that expect workers to mutually 
monitor and pressure peers could try to select workers with innate propensities to engage in 
such activities, our analysis suggests that their most sensible strategy would be to give 
workers financial participation and some shared decision-making as well as establish good 
labor-management relations.  These findings may have some implications for addressing the 
principal-agent problem in corporate governance.  Top executives frequently oppose profit 
sharing and broad-based stock option programs because of the free rider or 1/N problem.  The 
result is that many executives and their hired gun compensation consultants get boards to 
approve incentive plans that give most of the pie to themselves and other top officials.   
(Morgenson 2002:  B1; Blasi, Kruse, and Bernstein 2003).  If some shared capitalist 
programs and certain types of corporate cultures can actually address these same objections, 
then there may be a conflict of interest for top executives to make most of the strategic 
decisions on shared capitalist programs and corporate culture essentially by themselves.21 
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Appendix:   
 
General Social Survey questions on peer pressure and shared capitalism arrangements 
 
Ability to monitor co-workers:   
In your job how easy is it for you to see whether your co-workers are working well or 
poorly? On a scale of 0 to 10 please describe with 0 meaning not at all easy to see and 
10 meaning very easy to see. 
 
Response to shirking co-worker: 
If you were to see a fellow employee not working as hard or well as he or she should, 
how likely would you be to: 
a.  Talk directly to the employee 
b.  Speak to your supervisor or manager 
c.  Do nothing 
  Answer  options: 
    1    Not at all likely 
    2    Not very likely 
    3    Somewhat likely 
    4    Very likely 
    0    I do not have a supervisor or manager (for question b) 
 
Profit sharing:   
In your job are you eligible for any type of performance-based pay, such as individual 
or group bonuses or any type of profit-sharing?  IF YES, THEN:  Does the size of 
these performance-based payments depend on company profits or performance? 
 
Gainsharing:   
In your job are you eligible for any type of performance-based pay, such as individual 
or group bonuses or any type of profit-sharing?  IF YES, THEN:  Does the size of 




Do you own any shares of stock in the company where you now work, either directly 
or through some type of retirement or stock plan? 
 
Stock options: 
Do you currently hold any stock options in your company (vested or unvested)? 
 Fig 1: Percentage Distribution of Workers By How Well They 
Can See Whether Co-workers Are Working Well or Poorly
11.1


















Source:  General Social Survey 2002, q 924 In your job how easy is it for you to see 
whether your co-workers are working well or poorly? On a scale of 0 to 10 please 
describe with 0 meaning not at all easy to see and 10 meaning very easy to see: 
Sample size = 1536, eliminated 36 don’t knows and 19 no answers. 













Very Likely Somewhat Not Very Not at All
Figure 2:  Percentage Distribution of Workers Responses to Seeing Fellow Employee Shirking 
 
(Source: General Social Survey 2002) 
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Source:  Tabulated as follows: q925a 4 for very likely etc  q925b 4 for very likely 

















Quite or very bad   Neither good nor bad   Quite good   Very good












































No profit sharing or gainsharing
Profit sharing or gainsharing
 
Figure based on regression results from column 4 of Table 6.  The values represent a worker’s reported likelihood of talking to a shirking co-
worker (measured on 1-4 scale) relative to the likelihood for workers who receive neither profit sharing nor gainsharing and view employee-
management relations as quite or very bad. 
28 Table 1:  Cross-Tabulations of Responses on How Workers React to Shirking 
 
 
Panel A:  Numbers of Workers, by response to shirking behavior 
 
Would Talk to Worker or Supervisor 
 
         very likely   somewhat likely    not very likely  not at all  
    at  least  once    at  least  once     likely 
Would do nothing  
reverse coded as 
do something 
 
 very  likely    465   121     13     30 
 somewhat  likely   115   204     32     34 
 not  very  likely    27   127   112   114 
   not at all likely    20      34    114    242 
 
 
Panel B. Percentage of Workers, by Ability to Observe Shirking 
 
Would Talk to Worker or Supervisor 
        very likely  somewhat likely    not very  not at all  
        at least once  at least once        likely  likely 
 
Ability to see whether 
co-worker is shirking 
7                         High (7 -10)      41%    29%    13%    16% 
  Low  (0-3)    29%   24%   20%   27% 
   
Source:  Tabulated from General Social Survey, 2002. 
 
Figures represent row percentages.  The number who reported in the high category was 894; 
the number in the low category was 174. Chi-sq.=35.999, p<.00001 
 
29 Table 2:  Cross-Tabulation of Numbers of Workers Who Would Talk to Shirking Co-
Worker and Numbers of Workers Who Would Talk to Supervisor or Manager About 
Shirking Co-Worker 
 
Likelihood of Talking to Supervisor or Manager 
 
Likelihood of    very likely    somewhat likely    not very likely  not at all likely 
Talking to Worker 
 
Very  likely    228     77   72   76 
Somewhat  likely   65   176   122   55 
not  very  likely    23   66   137   67 
not at all likely    32    55     60    301 
 
 




30 Table 3:  The Relation between Demographic and Job Market Factors and Peer Pressure 
e     
 
                    Dep.  var.:  Summated Likelihood  of Likelihood Likelihood
    rating      of doing      of talking      of talking to   
                    Something  to  shirker supervisor  or  manager
                (1)     (2)     (3)     (4)
Age  -0.022 (0.007) ** -0.002 (0.001) *  -0.008 (0.003) ** -0.009 (0.003) **
Education    -0.048 (0.033)   -0.011 (0.005) *  -0.012 (0.012)   -0.015 (0.012)  
Female  -0.323        (0.165) * -0.039 (0.027)   -0.312 (0.063) ** 0.075 (0.063)
Black  0.044      (0.207)   0.026 (0.034)   0.037 (0.079)   -0.093 (0.080)
Occupation                      
    Mgt. 1.312    (0.302) ** 0.167 (0.049) ** 0.597 (0.116) ** 0.376 (0.115) **
      Mgt.-related  0.063 (0.394) -0.057 (0.065)   -0.104 (0.151)   0.320 (0.148) * 
      Professional -0.416 (0.289) -0.076 (0.047)   -0.184 (0.110)   -0.060 (0.110)  
        Technical  -0.685 (0.383) -0.045 (0.063)   -0.158 (0.146)   -0.059 (0.147)
        Sales  0.416 (0.288) 0.047 (0.047)   0.138 (0.111)   0.142 (0.111)
      Clerical  -0.684 (0.269) ** -0.101 (0.044) *  -0.293 (0.104) ** -0.179 (0.104)
      Service  0.329 (0.261) 0.034 (0.043)   0.196 (0.101)   0.037 (0.100)
                 Blue-collar  (excl.)        
Size 1-9 ees.  0.889  (0.279) ** 0.107 (0.046) *  0.243 (0.106)  *  0.308 (0.108) **
       10-49 ees.  0.626  (0.254) *  0.042 (0.041)   0.162 (0.097)    0.233 (0.097)  
       59-99 ees.  0.343  (0.281)   0.026 (0.046)   0.113 (0.108)    0.131 (0.108)  
       100-999 ees.  0.098  (0.250)   -0.020 (0.041)   -0.014 (0.096)    0.086 (0.096)  
       2000+ ees. (excl.)                         
Tenure  0.028      (0.011) * 0.002 (0.002)   0.008 (0.004)   0.007 (0.004)
Non-profit  ee.          0.251  (0.310) 0.052 (0.051) -0.021 (0.117)  0.198 (0.119)
Gov’t. ee.  -0.189  (0.209)   -0.079 (0.034) *    -0.204 (0.079)  ** -0.011 (0.080)
For-profit  ee.  (excl.)                         
Constant  8.664  (0.543) ** 0.582 (0.089)            
N        1467  1470 1504 1472
(Pseudo) R-sq.  .071  .061 .038   .016    
Column 1 presents results of OLS regression, while columns 2-4 present results of ordered probits. 
* p<.05  ** p<.01  Standard errors in parentheses.  
31 Table 4:  Percentage of Workers in Shared Capitalist Programs and in Enterprise 
Decision-Making, and with Different Qualities of Labor-Management Relations 
 
GSS 2002    NOS 2002   
Shared Capitalist Financial Incentives    
Profit-sharing                                                 34%    38% 
Gain-sharing                                                  23%                                         13% 
Own company stock                                      21%    21% 
Hold stock options                                         13%    -- 
Granted stock options last year                       --    3% 
Any  of  above      43%     -- 
 
 
Participation in Decision-Making 
Work  as  part  of  team     61%     -- 
Often participate with others in making 
 decisions  that  affect  job   42%     -- 
Often participate with others in helping 
  set how things are done on job  45%        -- 
Percent of employees involved in  
self-managed  teams    --     17% 
Percent of employees in Quality Circles 
or Employee Involvement Committees--     17% 
Existence of worker safety committees  --        49% 
 
Labor/Management Relations 
% who describe relations as  
Very  good     34%     52%   
quite  good     36%     41% 
neither good nor bad      22%          6% 
quite or very bad        8%          1% 
 
% who agree that they/workers “trust management” 
Strongly  agree     28%     30% 
A g r e e       4 8 %      5 5 %  
Neither  agree  nor  disagree   --     10% 
Disagree     18%          4% 
Strongly disagree        6%          1% 
 
 
Source:  Tabulated from General Social Survey 2002 and National Organizations Study, 
2002.
32 Table 5:  Measures of the Responses of Workers to Shirking, by the Characteristic of 
Employing Organization 
   Responses  of  Workers,  Measured  by 
 
                                                 % very likely to  
      S u m m a t e d   R a t i n g
9   act against shirking 
 
Characteristic of Employing Organization 
(Yes= Has characteristic; No= does not have it)YES       NO   YES    NO 
 
Shared Capitalist Financial Incentives    
Profit-sharing  7.97   7.45*    43%   34%* 
Gain-sharing  8.05   7.50*    41%   36%* 
Own company stock or Hold stock options    7.59     7.62  37%  37% 
   
Participation in Decision-Making 
Work as part of team        8.12   6.84*    43%   27%* 
Often participate with others in  
  how job is done      8.27   6.84*    47%   26%* 
 
Labor/Management Relations 
% who describe relations as  
Very good        7.92    --    45%      -- 
quite good        7.56    --    32%      -- 
neither good nor bad      7.36    --    32%      -- 
quite or very bad      7.32    --    38%      -- 
 
% who agree that they “trust management” 
Strongly agree       8.09   --    46%    -- 
Agree      7.56    --   33%        -- 
Disagree     7.31  --   36%        -- 
Strongly disagree      7.07  --    36%    -- 
 
* Difference from “yes” group is significant at p<.05 
 
 
                                                 
9  The summated rating is the sum of the responses to the three questions about whether workers would talk to 
the employee or to a supervisor or manager or do nothing when they encountered shirking.  Responses to the 
questions about talking to the worker or to the supervisor/manager are coded 1 to 4 with higher values reflecting 
greater likelihood of acting.  Responses to the question about doing nothing are reverse coded 1 to 4, so that 
higher values reflect greater likelihood of acting. 
33 Table 6:  Regression Analysis of Company Policies and Opposition to Shirking 
                          
                   
                       
Dep  var.:  Summated Summated Likelihood   Likelihood   Likelihood
  rating 
 
    rating 
 
    of doing      of talking      of talking to   
something   to  shirker sup./manager
   (1)        (2)       (3)       (4)       (5)      
Without interactions                           
Profit- or gain-sharing  0.557  (0.190) ** 0.402 (0.186) *   
         
       
      
0.086 (0.031)  ** 0.114 (0.073) 0.186 (0.073) **
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  View  of  mgt-ee  relations:
  Quite or very bad (excl.)                               
  Neither good nor bad        -0.016 (0.334)   -0.064 (0.056)    0.010 (0.134)   0.048 (0.132)  
  Quite good        -0.109 (0.317)   -0.108 (0.053)  *  0.036 (0.127)   -0.020 (0.126)  
  Very good           0.054 (0.326)    -0.013 (0.054)     0.090 (0.131)    0.008 (0.130)   
n   1179  1176 1178   1206 1180  
(Pseudo) R-sq.  .071  .135 .113   .063 .03  
*  p<.05  ** p<.01 (s.e.)  Cols. 1-3 contain OLS regressions, and cols. 4-5 contain ordered probits.   
All regressions use the demographic and job variables from Table 3 as controls. 
34  
Table 7:  Regression Estimates of Coefficients on the Interaction of Profit/Gain Sharing and Mgt-Employee Relations 
                 
    
 
 
Dep. var.:    Summated      Likelihood      Likelihood    Likelihood 
    rating      of doing      of talking    of talking 
          something      to shirker 
 
  to sup./manager 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Have profit- or gain-sharing and view 
of mgt-ee rels. is:                           
     Quite or very bad  -0.179 (0.650)   0.061 (0.108)   -0.089 (0.264)   -0.159 (0.259)  
     Neither good nor bad    0.123 (0.387)   0.023 (0.065)   -0.070 (0.152)   0.133 (0.151)  
     Quite good    0.221 (0.286)   0.091 (0.048)   -0.003 (0.113)   0.198 (0.112)  
     Very good    0.875 (0.300) **  0.121 (0.050) *  0.396 (0.121) ** 0.274 (0.119) * 
Own co. stock or hold                           
  stock options    0.007 (0.210)   0.017 (0.035)   0.088 (0.083)   -0.024 (0.082)  
Work as part of team    0.925 (0.173) *  0.109 (0.029) **  0.353 (0.068) ** 0.322 (0.068) **
Often participate with                            
  others in how job is done    1.057 (0.173) **  0.164 (0.029) **  0.462 (0.069) ** 0.170 (0.068) * 
View of mgt-ee relations:                           
  Quite or very bad (excl.)                           
  Neither good nor bad    -0.084 (0.393)   -0.051 (0.065)      
   
0.013 (0.157) -0.028 (0.156)
  Quite good    -0.192 (0.375)   -0.117 (0.063)   0.027 (0.151)   -0.117 (0.149)  
  Very good    -0.264 (0.381)
 
  -0.032 (0.064)   -0.061 (0.153)
 
  -0.114 (0.152)  
n 1176 1178 1206 1180
(Pseudo) R-sq.    .138 .115   .066 .030  
*  p<.05  ** p<.01 (s.e.)  Cols. 1-2 contain OLS regressions, and cols. 3-4 contain ordered probits.   
All regressions use the demographic and job variables from Table 3 as controls. 
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